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Is Nominal Use an Answer to the 
Free Speech and Right of Publicity Quandary?: 
Lessons from America’s National Pastime 
Raymond Shih Ray Ku
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INTRODUCTION 
From its inception, the right of publicity has existed in an uneasy state 
of tension with the First Amendment.  By prohibiting the use of an individ-
ual‘s name or likeness, the right of publicity—like other categories of intel-
lectual property law, including copyright and trademark—creates a proper-
ty right in information that may be asserted by its owner to restrict the 
expression of others.1  By definition, laws that limit expression implicate 
the First Amendment‘s prohibition against the abridgment of speech, even 
if this does not mean that all such limitations are unconstitutional.  As the 
Supreme Court has noted, some restrictions upon speech imposed by intel-
lectual property law promote freedom of expression.2  Not surprisingly, this 
tension between free speech and intellectual property laws in general, and 
the right of publicity in particular, has been a source of continuing conster-
nation for courts3 and commentators alike.4 
 
* Professor of Law, Co-Director Center for Law, Technology & the Arts, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law.  I would like to thank the editors of the Chapman Law Review for inviting 
me to the symposium, for the hospitality they showed during the symposium, and for their excellent 
work preparing this article for publication. 
 1 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (―One who appropriates the 
commercial value of a person‘s identity by using without consent the person‘s name, likeness, or other 
indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability . . . .‖). 
 2 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (―In our haste 
to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the en-
gine of free expression.‖). 
 3 See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); ETW Corp. v. Jireh 
Publ‘g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); Cardtoons, L.C., v. Major League Baseball Players Ass‘n, 95 
F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001); Pa-
vesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d. 363 
(Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 4 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right 
of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836 (1983); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 
IND. L.J. 1 (1997); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights into Intellectual Property and 
Free Speech Theory: Sam, You Made the Pants Too Long!, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 283 
(2000); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 903 (2004); 
F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge: The “Transformativeness” Test for Analyzing a First 
Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 1 (2003); Shubha Gosh, On Bobbling Heads, Paparazzi, and Justice Hugo Black, 45 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 617 (2005); David S. Welkowitz & Tyler T. Ochoa, The Terminator as Eraser: 
How Arnold Schwarzenegger Used the Right of Publicity to Terminate Non-Defamatory Political 
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One factor that complicates this tension is that, as it has evolved, the 
right of publicity does not respond to a single interest, but instead responds 
to a cluster of related though distinct interests, each raising different First 
Amendment questions.  The least controversial of these interests is when 
the courts prevent unauthorized use of an individual‘s name or likeness in a 
manner that falsely signals endorsement or sponsorship.5  False speech is 
generally not constitutionally protected speech.6  A little more controversial 
is protecting individuals from being unwillingly thrust into the public eye 
for commercial purposes.7  In these types of cases, an individual‘s interest 
in liberty and dignity may be said to outweigh the speech interests at stake,8 
though the Supreme Court has generally been skeptical of restrictions upon 
the dissemination of truthful information.9  Lastly, the right of publicity 
protects the economic interests of an individual from having her name or 
likeness exploited even when there is no confusion regarding the individu-
al‘s relationship with the use.10 
This essay explores three approaches developed by courts to alleviate 
the tension between free speech and the right of publicity.  It focuses upon 
the last set of interests—non-misleading, for-profit uses of a celebrity‘s 
name or likeness.  Perhaps by coincidence—or, perhaps because it is this 
nation‘s pastime—professional baseball is fertile ground for these contro-
versies.  Not only does the modern right of publicity begin with a dispute 
over baseball cards, its future should be defined by fantasy baseball.  In 
C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Ad-
vanced Media, L.P., the Eighth Circuit held that the use of players‘ names 
and statistics for online fantasy baseball did not violate the right of publici-
ty.11  The court used an approach that not only reconciled the speech inter-
ests at stake in that case, but also adopted an essential First Amendment sa-
feguard present in trademark law—nominal use—that has yet to be 
explicitly recognized in the right of publicity context. 
I.  PLAY BALL! OR NOT 
From the beginning, courts have recognized the inherent tension be-
tween one person‘s right not to be spoken about and another‘s constitution-
al guarantee of freedom of expression.  After tracing the origins of the right 
of publicity, this part discusses how courts have attempted to balance these 
 
Speech, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 651 (2005). 
 5 See, e.g., Pavesich, 50 S.E. 68. 
 6 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 7 See, e.g., Pavesich, 50 S.E. 68. 
 8 Id.; see also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890). 
 9 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
 10 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995) (―The name, likeness, and 
other indicia of a person‘s identity are used ‗for purposes of trade‘ . . . if they are used in advertising the 
user‘s goods or services, or placed on merchandise marketed by the user, or are used in connection with 
services rendered by the user.‖). 
 11 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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competing interests.  Through the lens of the three cases involving the right 
of publicity and baseball, it demonstrates the limits and promise of these 
efforts. 
The right of publicity originates from Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis‘ seminal article, The Right to Privacy.12  Responding to what they 
perceived to be the abuses of ―modern‖ media, the authors argued that the 
common law recognized a ―right to be let alone.‖13  Drawing from common 
copyright, which recognized a property right in one‘s unpublished papers, 
including letters and manuscripts, The Right to Privacy argued that the law 
protects the ―[t]houghts, emotions, and sensations‖ that make up one‘s per-
sonality.14  As such, the law should provide ―to each individual the right of 
determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emo-
tions shall be communicated to others[,]‖ regardless of how these aspects 
of one‘s personality are expressed.15 
To do this, The Right to Privacy de-linked the protected attributes of 
personality from the physical pieces of property protected by the common 
law that provided evidence of that personality.16  According to the authors: 
The circumstance that a thought or emotion has been recorded in a permanent 
form renders its identification easier, and hence may be important from the point 
of view of evidence, but it has no significance as a matter of substantive right.  If, 
then, the decisions indicate a general right to privacy for thoughts, emotions, and 
sensations, these should receive the same protection, whether expressed in writ-
ing, or in conduct, in conversation, in attitudes, or in facial expression.17 
However, even Warren and Brandeis recognized that the right of pri-
vacy is not absolute and would not prohibit, among other things, ―any pub-
lication of matter which is of public or general interest[,]‖18 or apply to 
facts published by the individual or with her consent.19  The authors, there-
fore, emphasized that ―[i]t is the unwarranted invasion of individual priva-
cy which is reprehended, and to be, so far as possible, prevented.‖20 
Warren and Brandeis‘s original conception of the right of privacy is il-
lustrated by Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.,21 one of the ear-
liest decisions recognizing the right.  In Pavesich, the plaintiff complained 
that the unauthorized use of his photograph in conjunction with an adver-
tisement for life insurance violated his right to privacy.22  The advertise-
 
 12 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 195, 206–07. 
 15 Id. at 198. 
 16 See Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 
41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647 (1991). 
 17 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 206. 
 18 Id. at 214. 
 19 Id. at 218. 
 20 Id. at 215. 
 21 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
 22 Id. at 68–69. 
KU 11/10/2008 8:51 AM 
438 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 11:435 
ment used the plaintiff‘s image alongside a picture of an ill-looking indi-
vidual in conjunction with statements supposedly from those pictured about 
the value of buying insurance while in good health.23  In rejecting the de-
fendant‘s free speech claim, the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that, 
―[t]here is in the publication of one‘s picture for advertising purposes not 
the slightest semblance of an expression of an idea, a thought, or an opi-
nion, within the meaning of the constitutional provision which guaranties to 
a person the right to publish his sentiments on any subject.‖24  Instead, it 
was a serious assault on individual liberty.  According to the court, the un-
authorized use of one‘s image in advertising is the equivalent of slavery:  
The knowledge that one‘s features and form are being used for such a purpose, 
and displayed in such places as such advertisements are often liable to be found, 
brings . . . even the individual of ordinary sensibility, to a realization that his li-
berty has been taken away from him; . . . that he is for the time being under the 
control of another, that he is no longer free, and that he is in reality a slave . . . .25 
As such, the court established a rule that ―the publication of one‘s pic-
ture without his consent by another as an advertisement, for the mere pur-
pose of increasing the profits and gains of the advertiser, is an invasion of 
[the right of privacy] . . . .‖26  Because the plaintiff never consented to the 
public use of his image, Pavesich is a rather straightforward application of 
Warren and Brandeis‘s right of privacy. 
Given the scope of the right of privacy, how did it develop into the 
right of publicity, or what William Prosser described as ―[a]ppropriation, 
for the defendant‘s advantage, of the plaintiff‘s name or likeness‖?27  In 
other words, how did a right to prevent the disclosure of one‘s personal 
thoughts and emotions become a right to control the use of one‘s public 
image?  As we will see, the ceiling established by the right of privacy be-
comes the floor for the right of publicity.  What develops out of the conclu-
sion that the right of privacy is constrained by expression involving matters 
of public concern—subsequently described as newsworthy—is the corol-
lary that when the expression is not newsworthy it is not privileged.  As 
Diane Zimmerman notes: 
If a use of a celebrity‘s identity occurs in a ―newsworthy‖ setting, the use does 
not, all concede, violate any property right.  But matters quickly go awry because 
the flip-side assumption seems to be that if a use is not newsworthy, it must per-
force be commercial.  And if it is commercial, then it does not have a First 
Amendment dimension and is fair game for regulation.28 
To illustrate this point, consider the following decisions involving the 
 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 80. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 81. 
 27 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (identifying four different cate-
gories of privacy-related torts, including misappropriation). 
 28 Zimmerman, supra note 4, at 295 (citations omitted). 
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right of publicity claims of baseball players. 
The first case, Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 
established the modern right of publicity.29  Haelan involved the consen-
sual use of photographs of baseball players by competing chewing gum 
manufacturers in connection with the sale of gum.30  The plaintiff, Haelan, 
alleged that, not only had the ball players consented to the use of their pho-
tographs for such purposes; they also agreed not to grant similar rights to 
any other gum manufacturer.31  In response, the defendant, Topps, argued 
that the right of privacy was a personal right and could not be assigned to 
plaintiff and, as such, the players‘ agreements represented nothing more 
than a release of liability under New York‘s statutory right of privacy and 
did not create a separately enforceable interest.32  Because Topps also ob-
tained the players‘ consent, the players had no grounds for complaint.33  In 
deciding for the plaintiff, Judge Jerome Frank concluded that, ―in addition 
to and independent of that right of privacy . . . a man has a right in the pub-
licity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege 
of publishing his picture . . . .‖34  According to Judge Frank: 
This right might be called a ―right of publicity.‖  For it is common knowledge 
that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from having 
their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel 
sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements, 
popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, 
trains and subways.  This right of publicity would usually yield them no money 
unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any other 
advertiser from using their pictures.35 
Chief Judge Swan concurred on the basis that the case should be re-
manded on the claim that Topps intentionally induced the players to breach 
their contracts with Haelan.36 
While Haelan is important for its recognition and defense of the right 
of publicity, for this discussion the decision is more important for what it 
does not address.  Consider the fact that the majority‘s discussion regarding 
the right of publicity is arguably dicta.  As Chief Judge Swan concluded, 
the case could have been resolved under basic contract principles, and did 
not require the establishment of an independent property right.37  Further-
more, Judge Frank‘s concern that, without the right of publicity, ball play-
ers would make no money from advertising,38 is not only unsupported by 
 
 29 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 30 Id. at 867. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 There was some suggestion that Topps may not have obtained the consent of one player, al-
though this fact did not impact the court‘s analysis.  Id. at 868. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 869 (Swan, J., concurring). 
 37 See id. 
 38 Id. at 868 (majority opinion). 
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the facts of the case, it is far from inevitable.  Topps did not argue that the 
right of privacy did not entitle the players to control the use of their photo-
graphs, either because: (1) they were public personalities; or (2) because 
they already consented to the publication of similar photographs by Haelan.  
As such, there was no threat to the players‘ ability to obtain compensation 
for the use of their photographs in advertising.  The right of privacy guar-
anteed them that opportunity (at least to the extent that Topps valued the 
players‘ cooperation in posing for their photographs).  Instead, the problem 
was that the players, presumably in exchange for additional compensation, 
consented to competing uses of their photographs, despite an earlier prom-
ise to Haelan.39 
Moreover, while the baseball cards were distributed in connection 
with the sale of chewing gum, the players‘ photographs were not used spe-
cifically to advertise gum.  Yet, there is no discussion whether the differ-
ences between baseball cards and advertising require a separate First 
Amendment analysis (perhaps because the defendant was a competing 
chewing gum manufacturer rather than a member of the press).  Even if one 
agrees with Pavesich that unauthorized uses of one‘s likeness in advertising 
is akin to slavery,40 that does not mean that the use of the players‘ photo-
graphs on baseball cards is the same.  Lastly, while one might ultimately 
conclude that, for First Amendment purposes, promotional uses that en-
courage the sale of an unrelated product are equivalent to advertising, the 
question does not even arise in Haelan.  Instead, in response to competing 
commercial uses, the court almost reflexively recognizes a property interest 
in the player‘s image disconnected from the dignitary harms associated 
with the right of publicity and in opposition to the players‘ own actions.41  
The court does this without any consideration of the First Amendment in-
terests at stake.42  In Haelan, freedom of speech, literally, is not an issue. 
The next decision in the baseball trilogy, Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major 
League Baseball Players’ Ass’n,43 illustrates how courts have responded to 
First Amendment concerns after Haelan.  Under this approach, defendants 
must justify their use of celebrity images and demonstrate that the use is 
sufficiently important to society to outweigh the right of publicity.44  In 
Cardtoons, the defendant produced humorous trading cards that featured 
caricatures of major league baseball players, including Barry Bonds, who 
was called ―Treasury Bonds.‖45  The cards ridiculed the players for, among 
 
 39 See id. at 867. 
 40 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80 (Ga. 1905). 
 41 See Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868. 
 42 See id. 
 43 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 44 Id. at 972.  This approach follows the Supreme Court‘s treatment of the subject in Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., in which the Court held that the First Amendment did not preclude a right 
of publicity when the news media broadcasted the plaintiffs‘ entire performance.  433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 45 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 962. 
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other things, their compensation, egos, and physical characteristics.46  The 
Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA), the exclusive col-
lective bargaining agent for all active major league baseball players, 
claimed that the cards violated the players‘ rights against false representa-
tion under the Lanham Act and the right of publicity.47  Because the cards 
did not fall within the statutory exception for news, Cardtoons‘ use of the 
players‘ likenesses would be prohibited by Oklahoma‘s right of publicity 
statute, unless it could successfully assert a First Amendment defense.48 
If a newsworthy use of celebrity images is one talismanic category of 
protected speech, Cardtoons establishes parody as another.  According to 
the court, the trading cards implicate ―some of the core concerns of the 
First Amendment.‖49  In explaining the value of parody, the court noted: 
A parodist can, with deft and wit, readily expose the foolish and absurd in socie-
ty.  Parody is also a valuable form of self-expression that allows artists to shed 
light on earlier works and, at the same time, create new ones.  Thus, parody, both 
as social criticism and a means of self-expression, is a vital commodity in the 
marketplace of ideas.50 
Because of their significance in society, celebrities are both appropri-
ate targets and vehicles for such social criticism.51  And, in the absence of 
First Amendment protection, celebrities are not likely to license or consent 
to such uses, thus depriving the public of important, if not core, First 
Amendment expression.52 
Correspondingly, the court concluded that recognizing a First 
Amendment privilege for celebrity parodies did little to harm the interests 
protected by the right of publicity.53  The court reasoned: 
The right is thought to further economic goals such as stimulating athletic and ar-
tistic achievement, promoting the efficient allocation of resources, and protecting 
consumers.  In addition, the right of publicity is said to protect various non-
economic interests, such as safeguarding natural rights, securing the fruits of ce-
lebrity labors, preventing unjust enrichment, and averting emotional harm.54 
The court concluded that, given the importance of parody as social 
commentary and criticism, none of these interests were of sufficient weight 
to justify restricting the parody baseball cards.55 
With regard to the economic justifications, the court concluded that 
the parodies are unlikely to change the incentives for people to become 
 
 46 Id. at 963. 
 47 Id. at 966. 
 48 Id. at 968. 
 49 Id. at 972. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See id. 
 52 Id. (―Indeed, the director of licensing for MLBPA testified that MLBPA would never license a 
parody which poked fun at the players.‖). 
 53 Id. at 976. 
 54 Id. at 973. 
 55 Id. at 976. 
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baseball players.56  In the words of the court, ―it is unlikely that little leagu-
ers will stop dreaming of the big leagues or major leaguers will start ‗dog-
ging it‘ to first base if MLBPA is denied the right to control the use of its 
members‘ identities in parody.‖57  Likewise, non-advertising uses of celebr-
ity images were not likely to reduce the value of that likeness, and argua-
bly, may increase that value.58  As such, the right of publicity would not be 
used to maximize value, but, instead, to suppress criticism and ―permanent-
ly remove a valuable source of information about their identity from the 
marketplace.‖59  Lastly, the baseball cards were not likely to confuse or 
deceive consumers.60 
With regard to the non-economic justifications, the court rejected the 
natural rights argument out of hand as nothing more than a ―blind appeal[ ] 
to first principles . . . .‖61  In response to the claim that celebrities are en-
titled to the fruits of their labor, it noted that celebrities ―are often not fully 
responsible for their fame.‖62  Moreover, with regard to parody, this was an 
untenable argument that celebrities should ―enjoy the fruits of socially un-
desirable behavior.‖63  Lastly, the court rejected the argument that the right 
of publicity may be used to prevent emotional injuries because, unlike the 
right of privacy, publicity rights focus upon the loss of financial gain.64  
According to the court, ―fame is a double-edged sword—the law cannot al-
low those who enjoy the public limelight to so easily avoid the ridicule and 
criticism that sometimes accompany public prominence.‖65  One may dis-
agree with the court‘s balancing or conclude that the court‘s analysis was 
driven by its perception of the importance of parody as a form of social 
criticism.  Nonetheless, Cardtoons is illustrative of efforts to resolve First 
Amendment concerns in right of publicity cases by determining whether 
the unauthorized use as speech is valuable speech or, as Warren and Bran-
deis put it, ―in the public interest.‖66 
The final dispute in the baseball trilogy arose out of the operation of 
fantasy baseball leagues.  The defendant, C.B.C. Distribution and Market-
ing (―CBC‖) sold fantasy baseball products through the Internet that in-
cluded the names, performance, and biographical data of actual major 
league baseball players.67  These products allowed individuals to become 
 
 56 Id. at 973–74. 
 57 Id. at 974. 
 58 Id. at 975. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 975–76. 
 64 Id. at 976. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 214 and accompanying text.  The California Supreme 
Court subsequently relied upon Cardtoons and followed this balancing analysis when it concluded that 
―transformative‖ expression outweighs a celebrity‘s interest in the control of her name or likeness.  See 
Comedy III Prods. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001). 
 67 C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 
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fantasy ―owners‖ of a baseball franchise by creating their own teams and 
competing against the teams of other ―owners‖ based upon the actual per-
formance statistics of the ball players.68  The participants in these leagues 
paid fees to play and additional fees to trade players.69  Initially, C.B.C. li-
censed the use of the players‘ names and information.70  However, when 
that licensing agreement expired, MLBPA licensed the exclusive right to 
use that information to Major League Baseball, which began offering its 
own fantasy baseball products and services through its website, 
MLB.com.71  In response, C.B.C. filed a declaratory judgment action to de-
termine the legality of continuing to operate its fantasy games.72 
While both the district court and the court of appeals ultimately fol-
lowed the balancing approach illustrated by Cardtoons, concluding that 
there is a substantial public interest in discussing our Nation‘s pastime,73 
the case raises the tantalizing possibility of avoiding balancing altogether.  
Fundamental to the district court‘s analysis, and central to the court of ap-
peals‘ analysis, is the point that C.B.C. used the identities of the baseball 
players as facts and facts are not subject to intellectual property rights.74  
For example, the district court concludes that C.B.C. used the players‘ 
names as facts rather than ―as symbol[s] of their identit[ies],‖ as required 
by Missouri law.75  And, as facts, the players‘ names and performance sta-
tistics were part of information already in the public domain.76  Similarly, 
the court of appeals concluded that, ―the ‗recitation and discussion of fac-
tual data concerning the athletic performance of [players] command a sub-
stantial public interest, and, therefore, is a form of expression due substan-
tial constitutional protection.‘‖77  Moreover, ―the facts in this case barely, if 
at all, implicate the interests that states typically intend to vindicate by pro-
viding rights of publicity to individuals.‖78 
C.B.C. is intriguing for several reasons.  First, it hints at an alternative 
approach for resolving the tension between free speech and the right of 
publicity by distinguishing between factual uses of names versus publicity 
uses, for lack of a better term.  Unfortunately, the opinions do not readily 
explain how so-called factual uses of names differ from other uses typically 
controlled by the right of publicity.79  The court of appeals appeared con-
 
818, 820 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 68 Id. at 820–21. 
 69 Id. at 821. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 823; 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1096 (E.D. Mo. 2006). 
 74 505 F.3d at 823; 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1101. 
 75 C.B.C., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1089. 
 76 Id. at 1095. 
 77 C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 823–24 (quoting Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
307, 315 (Ct. App. 2001) (brackets in original)).  Ironically, Gionfriddo concluded that Major League 
Baseball‘s promotional use of ball-players‘ names and likenesses did not violate their publicity rights. 
 78 Id. at 824. 
 79 See infra Part II. 
KU 11/10/2008 8:51 AM 
444 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 11:435 
fused on this very point when it criticized the district court, stating: 
We think that by reasoning that ―identity,‖ rather than ―mere use of a name,‖ ―is 
a critical element of the right of publicity,‖ the district court did not understand 
that when a name alone is sufficient to establish identity, the defendant‘s use of 
that name satisfies the plaintiff‘s burden to show that a name was used as a sym-
bol of identity.80 
Apparently, the court of appeals missed the point.  As discussed in 
Part II, this distinction makes sense because the district court did not claim 
that a name cannot be used to identify an individual, but that C.B.C. was 
using the names and statistics descriptively.81  In other words, C.B.C. iden-
tified the players, but did not exploit their legally protected identities. 
Second, the appellate court‘s reference to the public‘s interest in base-
ball does little to address the fact that C.B.C. was not using celebrity im-
ages to report the news or as social commentary.  Under a Cardtoons ba-
lancing approach, the focus would be on how the information was used in 
expression (i.e., news, parody, or social criticism) rather than the topic of 
that expression (i.e., politics, sports, or entertainment).  In C.B.C., the play-
ers‘ names and information were used to make C.B.C.‘s game more appeal-
ing to customers.82  C.B.C. could have provided a game using fictional 
names and statistics, but it preferred to use actual names and statistics.83  
As such, MLBPA‘s argument that C.B.C. used the players‘ names and per-
formances to enhance the value of C.B.C.‘s fantasy baseball products and 
services, and that it would be unfair to allow C.B.C. to profit from that val-
ue without compensating the players, is not so easily dismissed by labeling 
C.B.C.‘s use as factual.  However, for the reasons discussed in Part II, the 
approach taken in C.B.C. is analogous to the nominal use defense in trade-
mark law and represents a valuable development for the right of publicity. 
II.  NOMINAL USE FOR THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
The tension between freedom of speech and intellectual property is 
not unique to the right of publicity.  The conflict between laws that regulate 
expression, and a constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression, exists 
in trademark and copyright law as well.84  And, while both trademark and 
copyright law recognize fair use as a defense, they also protect freedom of 
expression through ―definitional balancing.‖85  In other words, these laws 
 
 80 C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 822. 
 81 See infra Part II. 
 82 See C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 822–23. 
 83 See id. at 822. 
 84 See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, F(r)ee Expression?: Reconciling Copyright and the First Amend-
ment, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (discussing copyright‘s internal mechanism for 
balancing copyright and free speech); Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regu-
lation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 737 (2007) (discussing the ways in which trademark law and the First Amend-
ment differ in approach); see generally Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of 
Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999). 
 85 See Ku, supra note 84 (discussing the origins and limits of definitional balancing); see also 
Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and 
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seek to reduce the tension between free speech and intellectual property 
rights, not only by making an exception for unauthorized expression that is 
valuable, but by concluding that certain expression is not part of the proper-
ty right to begin with.  In copyright law, this can be found in the 
idea/expression dichotomy, which limits copyright protection to how an au-
thor expresses ideas and not the ideas themselves.86  In trademark law, de-
finitional balancing is found in the requirement of trademark use, which 
limits liability to circumstances in which a defendant uses the trademark as 
a trademark.  As the following argues, C.B.C. represents an effort to bring 
definitional balancing to the right of publicity and is analogous to the no-
minative use of trademarks as established by the Ninth Circuit‘s decision in 
New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc.87 
New Kids involved a right of publicity claim brought by the musical 
act, New Kids on the Block, against two newspapers that conducted reader 
polls.88  These polls asked readers to call 900-numbers to answer: ―Which 
one of the New Kids is the most popular?‖89 and ―Now which kid is the 
sexiest?‖90  Readers who called in were charged ―50 cents‖ and ―95 cents 
per minute,‖ respectively.91  The New Kids sold ―posters, T-shirts, badges, 
coffee mugs and the like‖ and also offered 900-numbers for fans to call and 
listen to the New Kids themselves and other fans as a means of generating 
income in addition to their musical act.92  They claimed that the newspa-
pers‘ use of the New Kids violated their trademark rights protected under 
the Lanham Act, or, essentially, that the papers were ―free-riding‖ on the 
New Kids‘ mark.93  As the court noted, this ―free-riding‖ is considered un-
fair because it represents something akin to fraud, and also because, ―by 
using a rival‘s mark, the infringer capitalizes on the investment of time, 
money and resources of his competitor . . . .‖94  The newspapers claimed 
that the First Amendment protected their use as a form of newsgathering.95 
Instead of reaching the First Amendment issue, the court chose instead 
to resolve the matter on non-constitutional, trademark law grounds.96  In-
itially, the court emphasized both the importance of trademark law in pre-
venting unfair competition and, at the same time, the concern that trade-
 
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1189–93 (1970) (discussing the importance of definitional balancing); 
Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Ex-
pression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283, 293–99 (1979) (discussing the importance of fair use in definitional ba-
lancing). 
 86 See Nimmer, supra note 85, at 1189–93 (discussing the importance of definitional balancing 
through the idea/expression dichotomy). 
 87 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 88 Id. at 304. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 See id. 
 93 Id. at 304–05. 
 94 Id. at 305. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
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mark law not unduly deplete the English language of words, phrases, or 
symbols.97  According to the court, trademark law expressly addresses the 
latter concern in two ways.  First, trademark law denies protection to marks 
that are, or become, generic.  As the court describes, ―[w]hen a trademark 
comes to describe a class of goods rather than an individual product, the 
courts will hold as a matter of law that use of that mark does not imply 
sponsorship or endorsement . . . .‖98  Second, ―when a trademark also de-
scribes a person, a place or an attribute of a product[,]‖ the law denies pro-
tection where the ―mark is used only ‗to describe the goods or . . . services 
 . . . .‘‖99  The newspapers‘ use of New Kids, however, did not squarely fit 
either category.  The New Kids were not generic, nor did the papers use 
their trademark to describe the papers‘ own product.100 
Nonetheless, the court concluded that it should recognize a related de-
fense for nominative uses of a mark.101  According to the court: 
[S]ometimes there is no descriptive substitute [for a mark], and a problem closely 
related to genericity and descriptiveness is presented when many goods and ser-
vices are effectively identifiable only by their trademarks.  For example, one 
might refer to ―the two-time world champions‖ or ―the professional basketball 
team from Chicago,‖ but it‘s far simpler (and more likely to be understood) to re-
fer to the Chicago Bulls.102 
Use of a trademark under these circumstances is ―best understood as 
involving a non-trademark use of a mark—a use to which the infringement 
laws simply do not apply . . . .‖103  To accommodate these nominative uses, 
the court established a three-part test.  Under this test, a commercial user 
would be entitled to use another‘s trademark without authorization if: (1) 
―[T]he product or service in question . . . [is] one not readily identifiable 
without use of the trademark;‖104 (2) ―only so much of the mark or marks is 
used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service;‖105 and 
(3) ―the user does nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, sug-
gest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.‖106 
In New Kids, the newspapers‘ use of the band‘s trademark satisfied all 
three elements.107  The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that 
the newspapers were also making money separately from their newsgather-
ing function, arguably in direct competition with 900-numbers offered by 
the band.108  According to the court, because the newspapers did not use the 
 
 97 Id. at 305–06. 
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 99 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4)). 
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band‘s trademark in a manner that implied sponsorship or endorsement, 
―trademark laws do not give the New Kids the right to channel their fans‘ 
enthusiasm (and dollars) only into items licensed or authorized by them.‖109  
As recently suggested by Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley, the right of pub-
licity could learn a great deal from trademark law.110 
Initially, the parallels between the right of publicity and trademark law 
should be readily apparent.  Both grant individuals control over certain uses 
of words, images, and symbols, and both are justified, at least in part, on 
the basis of preventing consumer confusion and unjust enrichment.111  Si-
milarly, the parallels between C.B.C. and New Kids should also be appar-
ent.  In both cases, the unauthorized users were profiting from using the 
protected mark and names at issue, and yet both were found to be non-
infringing.112  In C.B.C., the court focused upon the factual nature of the 
use of ball player names, while New Kids recognized an exception for no-
minative uses of trademarks.  As discussed earlier, it was not immediately 
apparent why the factual nature of the use should matter.  New Kids, how-
ever, sheds some light on C.B.C. if one considers it an attempt at defini-
tional balancing akin to nominative use in trademark law. 
As discussed in Part II, the district court originally concluded that 
MLBPA could not raise a right of publicity claim because C.B.C. used the 
players‘ names as facts rather than ―as symbols of their identities.‖113  Un-
der those circumstances, C.B.C.‘s use of ball player names and statistics 
can be equated with the nominative use at issue in New Kids.  C.B.C. used 
the ball player names to describe the individuals who took part in Major 
League Baseball and how they performed.  They were not being put to 
―publicity use‖ (i.e., ―lending‖ their hard earned credibility and reputation 
to the promotion of C.B.C.‘s fantasy baseball products and services).  In 
other words, the factual nature of ball players‘ names is not decisive.  Ball 
player names (and trademarks) are facts and would remain facts even if 
used as part of false advertising, but few would suggest that the factual na-
ture of such names and symbols should preclude liability when used in the 
context of false endorsement.  Rather, C.B.C.‘s use was decisive, even if 
some of the value of their products and services could be attributed to the 
use of real rather than fictional names and statistics.  C.B.C., like the news-
papers in New Kids, put the names to nominative use.  As in New Kids, it 
can be said that, under these circumstances, the right of publicity does not 
give celebrities the right to channel their fans‘ enthusiasm (and dollars) into 
only licensed or authorized products and services. 
 
 109 Id. 
 110 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark 
Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (2006). 
 111 Id. at 1164–65 (drawing the parallels between the right of publicity and trademark law and 
suggesting, among other things, that the right of publicity adopt a form of trademark use). 
 112 Compare C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 
505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007) with New Kids, 971 F.2d 302. 
 113 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1089 (E.D. Mo. 2006). 
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Additionally, the three-part test of New Kids described above would 
be useful in right of publicity cases as well.  Courts would permit the use of 
a celebrity‘s name without authorization if: (1) the celebrity in question is 
not readily identifiable without use of the person‘s name or likeness; (2) 
only so much of the celebrity‘s name or likeness is used as is reasonably 
necessary to identify the celebrity; and (3) the user does nothing that 
would, in conjunction with the celebrity‘s name or likeness, suggest spon-
sorship or endorsement by the celebrity. 
Consider how it would apply to the facts of C.B.C..  First, C.B.C. used 
the ball players‘ names to describe the actual players themselves; and, 
while there could be alternative ways to describe them, the players are not 
readily identifiable without resorting to their actual names.  Second, C.B.C. 
used only the names and statistics of the players, which was, arguably, no 
more than was reasonably necessary to identify them.  Third, C.B.C. did 
not use the players‘ names in any manner that suggested sponsorship or en-
dorsement.  As such, the New Kids test could become a valuable tool for 
evaluating unauthorized uses of celebrity names and likenesses.  Moreover, 
as a movement towards definitional balancing in right of publicity cases, 
recognizing the privileged status of nominative uses of celebrity names and 
likenesses represents an important effort to alleviate the tension between 
free speech and the right of publicity. 
CONCLUSION 
As the baseball cases illustrate, courts have developed three approach-
es to the free speech and right of publicity conundrum.  Traditionally, free-
dom of speech was literally not an issue and, subsequently, only an issue 
when the speech in question is sufficiently valuable to outweigh a celebri-
ty‘s right to control the use of her name or likeness.  The first position is 
clearly untenable; the second, undesirable.  Freedom of speech is clearly at 
stake when the law limits a speaker‘s ability to engage in expression and 
having First Amendment protection hang on whether judges believe that 
the speech is ―valuable,‖ while an improvement, is itself, problematic.  
However, as this essay suggests, there is another way.  Applying defini-
tional balancing to the right of publicity and privileging nominative uses of 
celebrity names and likenesses is not only a step towards harmonizing pub-
licity rights with both copyright and trademark law; it reduces the tension 
between free speech and the right of publicity.  When one considers that 
the Supreme Court recently upheld copyright‘s restrictions upon speech, in 
large part because copyright protects free speech through definitional ba-
lancing and fair use (or interest balancing),114 this approach for the right of 
publicity may not only be prudent, but constitutionally required. 
 
 114 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–19 (2003) (rejecting the need to subject copyright to 
heightened scrutiny because copyright has ―its own speech-protective purposes and safeguards.‖). 
